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CULTIVATING FEMINIST CRITICAL INQUIRY
ANNE C. DAILEY
This short essay offers two observations regarding the continuing
importance of feminist journals to the broader law school enterprise. I first
address how feminist journals help to foster a culture of critical inquiry on
law school campuses that is at the core of our ideal of liberal democratic
life. Second, I examine briefly how feminism, and feminist law journals in
particular, are central to this educational endeavor. The goal of these few
pages is to make a liberal argument for the continuing importance of these
distinctly illiberal journals in the legal academy.
Feminist journals clearly do not fit comfortably with prevailing
liberal democratic values. Contemporary liberalism defines membership in
the political community in strictly gender-neutral terms. One might even
say that this principle of gender neutrality reflects liberalism's core mission
to eliminate group-based exclusions to citizenship in favor of a principle of
universal equal treatment. Because feminist law journals define themselves
around a principle of gender difference, they inevitably run up against the
basic liberal norms of individual equality and gender neutrality. Yet
reconciling feminist law journals with liberal values certainly can be done.
These arguments will sound very familiar. A liberal argument for feminist
journals can emphasize the journals' remedial aim of rectifying the effects
of gender inequality, thus putting feminist law journals in the same category
as affirmative action policies or other remedial programs and institutions.
Another solution is to fit feminist law journals within the long tradition of
liberal interest group pluralism. In the interest group account, individual
feminists come together to form an association that reflects the pre-existing
commitments and values of its individual members. From this perspective,
feminist law journals are no different from the other voluntary partisan
associations that sustain liberal democratic life, such as political parties,
neighborhood associations, environmental clubs, and religious groups.
But I want to make a different, less conventional liberal argument
in favor of feminist law journals that captures something important about
these journals that is missing from both the remedial and the interest-group
accounts. I want to stress how feminist law journals, like feminist
institutions and associations more generally, play a formative, educating
role in the lives of individuals, particularly students. Feminist journals do
not just passively reflect the pre-existing interests of their members; they
teach. Nor is their goal simply to rectify past injustices. Rather, they have a
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continuing educative role to play in the institutional life of the law school
and, consequently, in the broader liberal democratic culture.
So here is my stronger claim: feminist journals help to foster a
culture of critical inquiry on law school campuses that is directly tied to the
skills o f liberal citizenship and the general health of a liberal democratic
polity. To the extent feminist law journals help to maintain group
difference, they are seen-in the conventional view-as violating the liberal
norm of individual equality. But maintaining difference in the sense of
maintaining associations and institutions of dissent is also a central part of
modem liberalism and essential to the survival of liberal democratic values
over time. The modem ideal of free speech, which notably first emerged in
a dissent by Justice Holmes,' grew out of the progressive-era belief in the
importance of critical inquiry-the scientific method, as it was then
called-to the flourishing of a modern democratic polity. 2 The emergence
of robust protection for free speech in the early twentieth century reflects in
part a concern for the absence of critical inquiry. In the absence of critical
inquiry, the ideal of democratic self-government inevitably withers over
time into passive obedience, conformity, and, at its most extreme, political
tyranny. Our modem constitutional system of individual rights and
democratic institutions is designed not simply to tolerate critical dissent, but
to promote it as a fundamental principle of individual liberty and collective
self-government in a pluralistic society.
Yet the skills of critical inquiry do not spontaneously emerge in the
course of human development; they must be learned. Schools, more than
anywhere else, are where these habits of thought are first taught in a
systematic way. Law school is the apex of this education in critical inquiry.
But law school has its own forms of intellectual domination and tyranny, of
stifling dissent and criticism, often in the form of neutrality, appeals to
objectivity, formal even-handedness, or procedural regularity-or even,
simply, the right answer. Feminist law journals are among those places
where a spirit of critical inquiry into the mainstream educational enterprise
is acquired and sustained. At their best, these journals are not simply
ciphers for pre-existing commitments, but places that teach a deeper kind of
critical inquiry than the standard classroom education in thinking like a
lawyer. Feminist journals-in all their particularity, their dissenting tone,
their critical stance, their intolerance of orthodoxy, the illiberal character of
their very being-are an essential institutional component of what makes a
truly liberal democratic educational enterprise come alive.
1See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
2 See Robert Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amendment: 1918-1928, 40
Md. L. Rev. 349 (1981).
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As i nstitutions, feminist law joumals can b e p laces ofb elonging.
Identities are formed, experiences are shared, a spirit of comradeship,
connection, and shared purpose can emerge. They are places that allow
some students to feel at home in the broader e ducational institution. But
they are also profoundly uncomfortable places at times. Their very
existence is a disruption. True dissent, as we have always known, is
disruptive. It is always, to some degree, subversive of social order and
friendly relations. Dissent s ows uncertainty and anxiety. Dissenting legal
opinions always hint at the possibility of future reversals. A culture of
critical inquiry means that feminists will instill uncertainty, conflict, and
doubt not only within the mainstream academy but also among ourselves.
This is a sign that feminism is maturing rather than stagnating. Managing
this kind of critical self-reflection and internal disruption without falling
back upon a policy of censorship or exclusion, or a politics of apathy,
alienation, or retaliation, is ultimately what defines the institutions that
sustain a truly liberal democratic culture.
Up to this point, nothing I have argued speaks in favor of a feminist
journal and so I come to my second point. It is possible that any critical
perspective would do just as well as feminism at fostering critical inquiry: a
Journal of Law and Poverty, for example, or Law and Psychoanalysis, or
Law and Theology. In part it is true that the education in critical inquiry I
am describing here is more a deliberative process than a particular outcome.
Its importance lies in the questioning of accepted norms, whatever they may
be. But I also want to argue that there is a deeply-rooted historical
connection between this process of critical inquiry and feminism. Feminism
offers a particular form of critical inquiry that questions the ideal of the
rational, unified, autonomous self. More than any other critical discipline,
feminism offers a well-developed tradition of self-inquiry and self-criticism.
An example may help to elucidate the uniqueness of the education
in critical inquiry that the feminist tradition offers. My hometown paper
recently ran the headline, Prostitute Testifies, in large bold letters, and
below this was placed a drawing of a woman weeping on the witness stand .
The article reported that, in the course of a municipal corruption
investigation in a nearby town, the federal government uncovered evidence
of sexual crimes committed by the Mayor against two young girls. At his
trial the woman, referred to as Jane Doe, testified that she began having sex
with the Mayor in exchange for money when she was nineteen, several
times a week, in order to sustain her drug habit.4 According to Jane Doe, in
recent years the Mayor began to ask her to bring him younger and younger
girls until she finally provided him with her eight-year-old daughter and
3 Manuala DaCosta-Femandez, Prostitute Testifies, New Haven Register, Mar. 14,
2003, at 1, available at http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=7370176&BRD
=1281 &PAG=461 &dept id=517515&rfi=8.
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ten-year-old niece for sexual encounters.5 The Mayor was convicted in
federal court on seventeen counts related to the child sexual abuse, and was
6
sentenced to thirty-seven years in prison. The mother in this story pled
guilty to state and federal charges in an effort, she says, to turn her life
around.' S he h as been sentenced to ten years in prison and an a dditional
three years of supervised release during which time she is to have no
contact with the children. 8 It is possible that the state will seek to terminate
her parental rights altogether.
How should the law understand Jane Doe, a mother who willingly
provided her own pre-adolescent daughter and niece for sexual services in
order to sustain her drug habit? Traditional accounts of the "good mother"
obviously do not work. Neither do straightforward accounts of "the
prostitute" or "the drug addict." Clearly there are multiple critical
perspectives that intersect here, including race and poverty, which cannot be
separated from the issue of gender. But I want to suggest tentatively that the
tradition of feminist scholarship has something uniquely important to add to
our understanding of individual choice and human agency as they were put
so tragically on display in the testimony of Jane Doe. It is simply not
possible, I suggest, to understand the complex interplay of sexual
exploitation, poverty, race, gender, substance abuse, and spectacular
maternal failure in the life of this woman without the kind of critical inquiry
into individual choice and personal agency that feminism brings.
Conventional analysis would view this woman as a transgressor. In
her line of work, she transgresses norms of female sexuality. In her parental
role, she transgresses norms of maternal love and protection. She is the
"other" mother in the story of King Solomon and the two prostitutes, the
one who cries out, "Cut the baby in two!"9 Yet in another, more disturbing
way, she also fulfills a social norm of woman as the very embodiment of
transgression, as disruptive, uncontrollable, sexually promiscuous,
dangerous, subversive, in revolt. In this role, women are as perceived and
treated as dangerous, sexual and irrational beings that pose a direct threat to
masculine rationality and power. This woman's testimony indeed unseats
the most powerful person in her town, in much the same way another young
woman almost unseated the president of the United States several years ago.
5 id.
6 Michelle Tuccitto, Giordano Gets 37 Years, New Haven Register, June 14, 2003,
available at http://www.zwire.com/site/news.dfm?newsid=8314206&BRD=1281&PAG
=461 &deptid=517515&rfi=8.
7 DaCosta-Fernandez, supra note 3.
8 Michelle Tuccitto, Giordano's Prostitute Gets 10 Years in Jail, New Haven
Register, Oct. 18, 2003, at Al.
9 See Anne C. Dailey, The Judgment of Women, in Out of the Garden: Women
Writers on the Bible 142 (Christina Buchmann & Celina Seigel eds., 1994).
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My hometown newspaper attempts to reassure its readership by referring to
Jane Doe as the "prostitute," thereby distancing us from her. But the
irrational transgressions of this woman cannot be so easily contained. Nor, I
would argue, should they be.
I do not mean to romanticize in any way the very real and life-long
suffering that Jane Doe caused these children. But there is something
distinctly feminist, I would argue; in insisting that this woman's tragic
failures lie at the extreme end of a continuum that ties us to her. There is
something distinctly feminist about a critical perspective that recognizes the
conflict, disruption, and revolt that lie just beneath the surface of ordinary,
rational life in ways that challenge our stated beliefs and desires. Only a
very few commit the egregious kind of child abuse that occurred in this
case. But we all do experience, to a greater or lesser extent, a capacity for
giving way to primitive fears, uncontrollable aggressions and instinctual
needs. For most of us the impulses are not so overwhelming that they
cannot be resisted or contained. But the people who do succumb are not just
prostitutes, pedophiles, or soldiers of war; they are also ordinary men and
women. This insight, one that I would argue is at the core of feminist
inquiry, has profound implications for a political culture that aspires to the
ideal of personal and collective self-government.
As feminism matures, and as it moves away from a one-
dimensional view of women as victims of male oppression, it has turned the
lens of critical inquiry inward. In trying to understand how the law should
treat Jane Doe, we have access to a rich tradition of feminist work on
domestic violence,'0 pornography," female genital surgeries, 2 and sexual
harassment. 3 Either directly or indirectly, this feminist scholarship explores
themes relating to identity, autonomy, selfhood, agency, and choice, themes
that challenge conventional assumptions about the "reasonable person,"
individual autonomy, and rational decision m aking in 1 aw.14 Critical race
'o See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of
Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973 (1991).
" See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1987); Carlin
Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1097
(1994).
12 See, e.g., Isabelle Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Traveling and
Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 2 3 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 189 (1992).
13 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J.
1683 (1998).
14 See generally Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 Yale L.J.
1265 (1993) (book review); see also Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and
Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 304 (1995); Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities, 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 7
(1989).
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feminists have been at the forefront of exploring questions of multiple
selves.' 5 Psychoanalytically-minded legal feminists, influenced by the work
of Carol Gilligan, Nancy Chodorow, and Judith Butler, have brought an
interdisciplinary approach to the study of individual choice and autonomy.'
6
This turn inward might seem risky; one could easily conclude that it
runs t he risk o f fostering a "blame-the-victim" mentality. B ut rather than
subverting feminist goals, I would argue that this inward turn in feminist
scholarship provides a model for a deeper, more complex view of the
emotional depths and complexities of individual decision making in law and
liberal theory, and for recognizing the vital importance of critical inquiry
and self-reflection to the ideals of individual autonomy and collective self-
government in law. It is my hope that feminist law journals will continue to
foster and defend a culture of criticism and self-criticism, however
uncomfortable and disruptive this may be or however potentially
threatening to the settled legal order. The survival of a liberal democratic
polity committed to meaningful choice and democratic self-government
could depend on the education in critical self-inquiry that feminist law
journals are uniquely situated to provide.
'5 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990).
16 See, e.g., M artha Grace Duncan, "So Young and So U ntender": Remorseless
Children and the Expectations of the Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1469 (2002).
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